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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Shawn M. Kesling appeals from the district court’s order summarily dismissing his petition
for post-conviction relief.
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
The district court described the underlying facts and proceedings as follows:
[On] July 12, 2017, [Kesling] pled guilty to MAKING, PASSING, UTTERING,
OR PUBLISHING FICTITIOUS BILLS, NOTES, AND CHECKS, FELONY, I.C.
§18-3606. Count I of the charging Information provides:
COUNT I
That the defendant, SHAWN MICHAEL KESLING, on or about the
1st day of June 2015, in the County of Ada, State of Idaho, did, with
the intent to defraud another, make, and/or pass, and/or utter any
fictitious bill, note, or check, purporting the bill, note, or check in
writing for the payment of money or property of some such bank
account when in fact, there is no such bank account in existence,
knowing the same to be fictitious, to-wit: check #1136 from a
fictitious Bluebird bank account made payable to Ada County in the
amount of $130.55.
Petitioner was sentenced on October 25, 2017 to a minimum fixed period of
confinement of four (4) years, followed by an indeterminate period of custody of
up to ten (10) years, for a total term not to exceed fourteen (14) years.
On February 28, 2018, Petitioner filed a pro se Petition for Post-Conviction
Relief. On April 11, 2018, the State filed a Motion for Summary Disposition. On
May 24, 2018, the Court entered an Order for Appointment of Counsel. On June
13, 2018, the Court entered an Order for Permission to Conduct Civil Discovery,
and on September 18, 2018, the Court entered an Order Enlarging Time to File
Amended Petition. On November 14, 2018, Petitioner filed an Amended Petition
for Post-Conviction Relief.
(Aug., pp.6-7. 1)

1

The Augmented Record is located in the computer file labeled “Motion to Augment – 47797 –
Kesling.pdf.”, and page citations are per the Adobe Reader page numbers.
1

In Count 1 of his Amended Petition, Kesling claimed his trial counsel provided ineffective
assistance by failing to “properly investigate and obtain evidence in defense of the crime; to wit;
bank statements and records that proved or tended to prove that he did not write checks on an
account that did not exist.” (R., p.21.) The district court further explained:
On May 21, 2019, Petitioner filed a Motion for Summary Disposition. After
numerous discovery issues, on July 11, 2019, the Court held a hearing on the cross
motions for summary disposition. Subsequent to that hearing, on August 2, 2019,
Petitioner filed a Motion to Stay and for Leave to Grant Time to File a Reply Brief.
On August 5, 2019, the Court granted the motion. On September 3, 2019, the
Petitioner filed a new Motion to Stay Proceedings to permit further investigation
into the business records of American Express Bluebird[2] and the check printing
company Harland Clarke. On September 9, 2019, the Court entered an Order
Denying the Motion to Stay, and on September 10, 2019, Petitioner filed a Motion
to Reconsider and Stay Proceedings. Petitioner submitted an Affidavit of Counsel
concerning the difficulty in obtaining information and banking records from
Bluebird American Express, Wells Fargo Bank, and to a lesser extent Harland
Clarke. On September 12, 2019, the Court entered an Order Granting Motion to
Reconsider and Staying Proceedings to allow for further discovery by Petitioner.
(Aug., p.7.)

2

According to the “Bluebird by American Express Member Agreement” appended to Kesling’s
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Alter of Amend Judgment (etc.),
Bluebird Checks are different than standard personal checks. Each Bluebird Check
must be pre-authorized prior to use, and in order to obtain pre-authorization, you
must have Available Funds in your Bluebird Account in an amount at least equal
to the Bluebird Check you wish to write. You must have sufficient Available Funds
in your Bluebird Account at the time you obtain pre-authorization. Bluebird Checks
that have not been pre-authorized will not be honored by us, regardless of whether
there are sufficient Available Funds in your Bluebird Account to cover the amount
of the Bluebird Check.
....
When we pre-authorize your Bluebird Check, we will provide you with an 8-digit
Pre-Authorization Code. The Pre-Authorization Code must be written by you on
the face of your Bluebird Check in the space indicated.
(Supp. R., pp.256-257 (capitalization verbatim).)
2

On November 7, 2019, Kesling’s attorney filed an affidavit on behalf of Harland Clarke
Corp. (a company that prints checks) Records Custodian Lowell James Mix, Jr., which stated:
Neither Harland Clarke nor I have any personal knowledge as to Mr. Kesling's
account status with American Express Bluebird other than Harland Clarke received
validated orders [for checks] from American Express that were then printed and
delivered by Harland Clarke.
(Supp. R., p.196.) Attached to Mr. Mix’s affidavit were copies of four print orders and a “business
records” affidavit. (Supp. R., pp.197-206.)
On January 15, 2020, the district court issued a Memorandum Decision and Order on Cross
Motions for Summary Disposition, granting the state’s summary dismissal motion and denying
Kesling’s summary disposition motion. (R., pp.92-103.) On February 18, 2020, Kesling filed a
motion to discharge his conflict counsel. 3 (Supp. R., pp.207-208.) Three days later he filed a pro
se Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment or in the Alternative for Relief from Judgment pursuant to
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 59(e), 60(b)(1), and 60(b)(6), 4 which was denied. (Aug., pp.3-13.)
After the Judgment dismissing Kesling’s post-conviction petition was entered, he filed a timely
Notice of Appeal. (R., pp.104-107).

3

Kesling’s motion to discharge his conflict counsel was presumably granted, although the record
does not directly verify that fact.
4

Kesling supported his Motion to Alter or Amend (etc.) with a memorandum that had 10 exhibits
attached. (Supp. R., pp.215-336.)
3

ISSUE
Kesling states the issue on appeal as:
Whether the district court erred by summarily dismissing Mr. Kesling’s petition for
post-conviction relief because there was a genuine issue of material fact with regard
to his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
(Appellant’s brief, p.6.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Kesling failed to demonstrate that the district court erred by summarily dismissing his
post-conviction claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel?

4

ARGUMENT
Kesling Has Failed To Demonstrate That The District Court Erred By Summarily Dismissing
His Post-Conviction Claim Of Ineffective Assistance Of Trial Counsel
A.

Introduction
In his Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, Kesling claimed, inter alia, his trial

counsel was ineffective because he failed to sufficiently investigate and obtain “bank statements
and records that proved or tended to prove that he did not write checks on an account that did not
exist[,]” namely, American Express account number ending in 0075. (R., p.21.) The district court
granted the state’s motion for summary disposition, finding that Kesling failed to meet his burden
of showing his trial counsel’s performance was deficient and/or prejudicial under Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). (R., pp.92-103.)
On appeal, Kesling contends the documents he presented below provided a genuine issue
of material fact that his trial counsel’s performance was (1) deficient because he failed to discover
through sufficient investigation that American Express account 0075 actually existed, and 2)
prejudicial because, absent counsel’s deficient performance, he would not have pled guilty to
forgery under I.C. § 18-3606. 5 (See generally Appellant’s brief, pp.7-27.)

5

Idaho Code § 18-3606 reads:
FICTITIOUS BILLS, NOTES, AND CHECKS – MAKING, PASSING,
UTTERING, OR PUBLISHING. Every person who makes, passes, utters, or
publishes, with intention to defraud any other person, or who, with the like
intention, attempts to pass, utter or publish, or who has in his possession, with like
intent to utter, pass, or publish, any fictitious bill, note or check, purporting to be
the bill, note, or check, or other instrument in writing for the payment of money or
property of some bank, corporation, copartnership, or individual, when in fact, there
is no such bank, corporation, copartnership, or individual in existence, knowing the
bill, note, check, or instrument in writing to be fictitious, is guilty of forgery and
punishable as provided by section 18-3604.
5

Kesling has failed to demonstrate that the district court erred. Specifically, the evidence
presented by Kesling failed to provide a genuine issue of material fact that (1) account number
0075 actually existed, and that further investigation by his trial counsel would have verified its
existence, (2) even if account number 0075 was found to exist, trial counsel’s performance did not
fall below an objective standard of reasonableness because he knew the State could have simply
amended the Information to bring the charge under the general forgery statute, § 18-3601 (R. p.97),
and (3) even without amendment, Kesling’s trial counsel could have reasonably concluded a
conviction under I.C. § 18-3606 “would be affirmed on appeal pursuant to State v. Bishop, 89
Idaho 416, 405 P.2d 970 (1965)” (id.).
B.

Standard Of Review
The appellate court exercises free review over the district court’s application of the

Uniform Post Conviction Procedure Act. Evensiosky v. State, 136 Idaho 189, 190, 30 P.3d 967,
968 (2001). On appeal from summary dismissal of a post-conviction petition, the appellate court
reviews the record to determine if a genuine issue of material fact exists, which, if resolved in the
applicant’s favor, would entitle the applicant to the requested relief. Matthews v. State, 122 Idaho
801, 807, 839 P.2d 1215, 1221 (1992); Aeschliman v. State, 132 Idaho 397, 403, 973 P.2d 749, 755
(Ct. App. 1999). Appellate courts freely review whether a genuine issue of material fact exists.
Edwards v. Conchemco, Inc., 111 Idaho 851, 852, 727 P.2d 1279, 1280 (Ct. App. 1986).
C.

Standards Applicable To Summary Dismissal Of Post-Conviction Claims
Post-conviction proceedings are governed by the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act.

I.C. § 19-4901, et seq. A petition for post-conviction relief initiates a new and independent civil
proceeding in which the petitioner bears the burden of establishing that he is entitled to relief.
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Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 522, 164 P.3d 798, 802 (2007); State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho
676, 678, 662 P.2d 548, 550 (1983).
Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for post-conviction
relief, in response to a party’s motion or on the court’s own initiative, if the applicant “has not
presented evidence making a prima facie case as to each essential element of the claims upon
which the applicant bears the burden of proof.” Berg v. State, 131 Idaho 517, 518, 960 P.2d 738,
739 (1998). Until controverted by the state, allegations in a verified post-conviction application
are, for purposes of determining whether to hold an evidentiary hearing, deemed true. Cooper v.
State, 96 Idaho 542, 545, 531 P.2d 1187, 1190 (1975). However, the court is not required to accept
either the applicant’s mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or the
applicant’s conclusions of law. Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 110, 112 (2001);
Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644, 647, 873 P.2d 898, 901 (Ct. App. 1994).
Bare assertions and speculation, unsupported by specific facts, do not make out a prima
facie case for ineffective assistance of counsel. Roman, 125 Idaho at 649, 873 P.2d at 903. Further,
allegations contained in a post-conviction petition are insufficient for granting relief when they are
clearly disproved by the record of the original proceeding or do not justify relief as a matter of law.
Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802; Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 903, 174 P.3d
870, 873 (2007).
D.

Standards Applicable To Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel Claims
A post-conviction petitioner alleging ineffective assistance of counsel must demonstrate

both deficient performance and resulting prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 68788 (1984); State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 137, 774 P.2d 299, 307 (1989). Under Strickland,
a defendant must demonstrate both that (1) his counsel’s performance fell below an objective
7

standard of reasonableness, and (2) a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result
of the proceedings would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-688, 694; Aragon v.
State, 114 Idaho 758, 761, 760 P.2d 1174, 1177 (1988). There is a strong presumption that
counsel’s conduct is within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Gibson v. State,
110 Idaho 631, 634, 718 P.2d 283, 286 (1986); Davis v. State, 116 Idaho 401, 406, 775 P.2d 1243,
1248 (Ct. App. 1989).
In assessing the prejudice prong in the context of guilty pleas, the United States Supreme
Court has explained the focus is upon “whether counsel’s constitutionally ineffective performance
affected the outcome of the plea process.” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985). The Court
explained, “in other words, in order to satisfy the ‘prejudice’ requirement, the defendant must show
that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty
and would have insisted on going to trial.” Id.; Cosio-Nava v. State, 161 Idaho 44, 48, 383 P.3d
1214, 1218 (2016).
E.

The District Court Correctly Concluded That Kesling Failed To Make A Prima Facie
Showing For Post-Conviction Relief
For its response to Kesling’s arguments, the state relies upon, and incorporates as if fully

set forth herein, the district court’s Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Cross-Motions for
Summary Disposition (R., pp.92-103), which is attached to this brief as Appendix A. 6 In addition
to the court’s analysis and conclusions, the state makes the folloHwing arguments in support of
the court’s Memorandum Decision and Order.

6

Kesling does not challenge the district court’s denial of his Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment
or in the Alternative for Relief from Judgment.
8

1.

Deficient Performance

Kesling argues that the district court erred in summarily dismissing his claim that his trial
counsel was deficient for failing to investigate, or more fully investigate, whether he had a Bluebird
bank account ending in number 0075 from which he made and passed check #1136 to Ada County
in the amount of $130.55. (Appellant’s brief, pp.7-13; see R, p.32 (check #1136 bearing Bluebird
account # 0075).) Kesling argues that “the evidence shows that [he] actually opened account 0680 with American Express’s Bluebird program[,]” and the record custodian for Harland Clarke
“explained that they received requests from American Express for Harland Clarke to print checks
on one of its ‘validated’ Bluebird accounts[,]’ with “number -0075 as the routing number, and with
one signature line, personalized for Shawn M. Kesling.” (Appellant’s brief, pp.10-12 (emphasis
in original).)
The district court recognized and agreed with the state’s arguments that (a) Kesling failed
to present a genuine issue of material fact that Bluebird checking account number 0075 existed
(R., pp.96-97, 100-102), (b) even if the account did exist, trial counsel’s performance did not fall
below an objective standard of reasonableness because he “knew that if the existence of the 0075
account had become a disputed issue before trial, the State could have simply amended the
Information to bring the charge under the general forgery statute, § 18-3601” (R. p.97), and (c)
“even without amendment, a conviction under I.C. § 18-3606 “would be affirmed on appeal
pursuant to State v. Bishop, 89 Idaho 416, 405 P.2d 970 (1965)” (id.).
a.

The District Court Correctly Concluded That Kesling Failed To Show That
Account 0075 Existed

The failed efforts of Detective Buie (prior to Kesling’s guilty plea) and Kesling’s postconviction counsel to verify the existence of account 0075 shows his trial counsel was not deficient

9

for not further investigating whether account 0075 existed.

(See generally R., pp.92-103

(Appendix A, pp.1-12.)
According to Detective Buie, after issuing a subpoena to American Express for information
on Kesling’s (alleged) account, on October 12, 2016, he was informed by American Express that
the bank account did not exist with that company. (R., pp.37, 42, 45.) Detective Buie faxed one
of Kesling’s checks, and one of Kesling’s wife’s checks, to American Express, and “asked [it] to
confirm once again whether the accounts exist, and whether or not the checks were fictitious.” (R.,
p.45.)
On November 2, 2016, Detective Buie received a voice message from American Express
employee “Samantha” in regard to the subpoena he sent, and she “stated the account numbers on
the checks did not coordinate with any accounts, and were fraudulently produced.” (R., p.45.)
According to Samantha, “American Express did not have any documents regarding the two
accounts[,]” and Detective Buie “was later provided a letter from American Express, dated
10/31/16, which stated the account number provided was invalid.” (Id.)
On March 31, 2017, Detective Buie received a phone call from “Paula” of American
Express, in response to an email request he sent two days earlier. (R., p.53.) Paula reported that
there were no transactions on Shawn Kesling’s American Express account between May 1, 2015
and June 30, 2016, which covered the date that Kesling allegedly passed a fictitious check to Ada
County for $130.55. (R., p.53; Aug., p.6.)
The Case Summary in the Settlement Sheet that was attached to the July 3, 2017, Guilty
Plea Advisory and Form, stated that Kesling “admitted to writing and passing the checks and to
knowing that there were no funds in the account but claimed it was not a fictitious account.” (Supp.
R., pp.39, 41, 47 (emphasis added).) Kesling’s trial counsel was aware that Kesling insisted

10

account 0075 actually existed. Nonetheless, on July 12, 2017, Kesling pled guilty to forgery
pursuant to I.C. § 18-3606. (Aug., p.6.) As part of his plea agreement with the state, Kesling
agreed to “give up any and all motions, defenses, or objections to the Court’s entry of judgment
and conviction that results from the Defendant’s acceptance of this plea agreement” (Supp. R.,
p.48), and his trial counsel informed the court that he had discussed with Kesling “the strength of
the evidence against him and possible defenses and the possible outcome of a jury trial” (Supp. R.,
p.128 (Tr., p.11, Ls.10-15)). Kesling’s trial counsel’s performance could not have been deficient
for not further investigating a potential defense, the existence of account 0075, which Kesling
knew about and gave up in order to take advantage of the state’s plea offer. (See
- - Supp. R., pp.63,
87 (Kesling’s guilty plea waived his defenses).)
Despite waiving his defenses and admitting his guilt, on November 14, 2018, Kesling,
through counsel, filed an Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief (R., pp.16-24), followed
by a Motion for Summary Disposition Relief with a supporting memorandum (Supp. R., pp.107119). In that memorandum, Kesling stated, “This is a case where the police and [the] State of
Idaho failed to conduct a thorough and complete financial investigation into the banking records
of Petitioner Kesling, instead charging him with Forgery based upon incomplete and inaccurate
records supplied by American Express.” (Supp. R., p.111 (emphasis added).) At that time, Kesling
blamed, at least in part, American Express for his failure to obtain proof that account 0075 existed.
Kesling’s post-conviction counsel then embarked on a mission to prove what Detective Buie could
not – that account number 0075 actually existed.
On April 30, 2019, Kesling’s post-conviction counsel filed an affidavit with attached
records from Harland Clarke Holdings (“Harland”), showing Harland had printed a series of
checks on “an Amex Bluebird account #72321927360075” for Shawn Kesling “four times over

11

the years on this Bluebird American Express Account.” (Supp. R. pp.95-106.) After reviewing
the Harland affidavit, the district court determined:
As stated in the affidavit itself, “Harland Clarke does not maintain or possess any
banking or financial records of Mr. Kesling other than the check order information
attached hereto.” Based upon the submitted affidavit from Harland Clarke, the
Court could only find that checks with the associated 0075 Account number may
have been issued to Petitioner. The Court cannot find that any account linked to
that account number actually existed with funds that may or may not have been
available to Petitioner at the time he wrote the checks forming the basis of the
underlying charge.
(R., p.101 (capitalization original); see generally Tr., p.6, L.18 – p.15, L.21 (July 11, 2019 colloquy
between the district court and defense counsel re: lack of proof that account 0075 existed).)
On September 10, 2019, Kesling’s post-conviction counsel filed an affidavit in support of
his request for “additional leave to subpoena document.” Although lengthy, review of counsel’s
chronology of his efforts to validate the existence of account 0075 is warranted:
3.

This matter has been pending for eighteen months. Counsel for petitioner
originally subpoenaed records from Bluebird American Express in the
spring of 2018. American Express responded with a form cover letter
stating the need for 60 calendar days to respond. It appears the original
subpoena contained an incorrect birth date for the Petitioner and was
returned without records. An additional subpoena was promptly prepared
and served on American Express. After another extension, Bluebird
American Express finally delivered banking records for Shawn Kesling on
or about September 10, 2018. . . .

4.

A copy of the records were mailed to the Petitioner. Counsel for petitioner
scheduled appointments to visit with the client at SICC and did prepare and
file an Amended Petition in November, 2018.

5.

Because Bluebird American Express did not provide cancelled checks or
ledger with checking account number that matched the Wells Fargo checks
in question, counsel []continued to investigate. Counsel met with the client,
contacted, Wells Fargo and issued an additional subpoena to Wells Fargo in
January, 2019. I also retained a private investigator to further assist me in
this regard, not satisfied with the records I had previously received so far.
As a result of additional investigation, I issued a subpoena to Harland Clarke
company to determine if that company might have some records
documenting the checking account of Shawn Kesling.
12

6.

In April, 2019, Wells Fargo returned a subpoena with records, none of which
are relevant to the checking account in question. Harland Clarke did return
records documenting checks ordered on a Bluebird American Express
account by Shawn Kesling. These records were submitted to the court in
an affidavit of counsel dated April 30, 2019. At that time, counsel for
petitioner believed he had exhausted all available banking records that
might still exist. Nonetheless, I have continued to have my investigator
contact Wells Fargo, American Express and Harland Clarke with regard to
the records involved in this case.

7.

These companies, while cooperative to a degree, do not readily respond to
phone calls, letters, or even subpoenas. It took my office several months to
contact the original investigator from Wells Fargo, Sue Peralt. Ms. Peralt
has now identified some information on how Wells Fargo acted as the
“custodian of funds” for Bluebird American Express. Based upon this
information, and questions raised by the court at the hearing in July, I
became further convinced that Bluebird American Express may not have
supplied all of the available records to my office. I have now issued another
subpoena to Bluebird asking for further production of records of cancelled
checks and checking activity.

8.

I have now received yet another request for extension from American
Express indicating that this company will not comply with the subpoena
until the end of October. See letter from American Express attached.

9.

As I indicated in my brief in reply to the State’s motion for summary
judgment, I have also been working with Harland Clarke to further supply
requested information on the check printing process. This is a time
consuming process as this company did not return phone calls to my
investigator for over a month. I have now reached a contact within this
company now and believe I can work with their corporate counsel to
develop an affidavit on the company’s check ordering procedures.

10.

I am in private practice and this case is consuming substantial resources of
my firm to litigate this case. I am working as diligently but I cannot control
or accelerate the responses of these banks and corporations to any greater
degree. I do believe that it is appropriate to stay this case until I notify the
court that American Express and Harland Clarke have fully complied with
my subpoena. I would request further stay until November 14, 2019.

(Supp. R., pp.186-188 (spelling and punctuation modified).)
On November 7, 2019, Kesling’s attorney filed an affidavit on behalf of Harland Clarke
Corp. (a company that prints checks) Records Custodian Lowell James Mix, Jr., which stated:
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Neither Harland Clarke nor I have any personal knowledge as to Mr. Kesling's
account status with American Express Bluebird other than Harland Clarke received
validated orders [for checks] from American Express that were then printed and
delivered by Harland Clarke.
(Supp. R., p.196 (emphasis added).) Mr. Mix’s affidavit did not explain in what way the check
printing orders were validated.
Finally, in a “Business Records Declaration” dated November 12, 2019, Vanessa Bradley,
employed with the Summons and Subpoenas Department of Wells Fargo, stated she was, “[u]nable
to locate any third party draft account payments from account in the name of Shawn Kesling, with
checking acct 72321927360075.” (Supp. R., p.324 (punctuation modified).) The record does not
show when Kesling’s post-conviction counsel received Ms. Bradley’s Declaration, but the fact that
she executed it over two months before the district court entered its Memorandum Decision and
Order (etc.) on January 16, 2020 (see R, p.92), strongly suggests Kesling’s counsel received it well
in advance of that decision. 7
The district court found that, after 19 months since it approved civil discovery, Kesling was
still unable “to produce some evidence from Bluebird American Express or Wells Fargo of the
existence of the 0075 Account in question.” (R., p.100; see Supp. R., p.227 (Memo. in Support of
Mot. to Alter or Amend) (“Throughout the twenty-three (23) months of Petitioner’s post-

7

The district court entered its initial Memorandum Decision and Order on summary disposition
on January 16, 2020. (R., p.92.) Kesling filed a motion to discharge his post-conviction counsel
on February 18, 2020, and filed a pro se Motion to Alter or Amend (etc.) three days later. (Supp.
R, pp.207-210.) Kesling attached Ms. Bradley’s Declaration (as Exhibit 6) to his memorandum in
support of his Motion to Alter or Amend (etc.). (Supp. R., pp.231, 324.) Although the district
court did not consider the Declaration when it entered its initial Memorandum Decision and Order
on January 16, 2020, inasmuch as Kesling made it a part of the underlying record in challenging
the court’s initial ruling, and because it was presumably considered by the court in denying his
motion to alter or amend its ruling, it should be considered by this Court. Kesling should not be
able to shield from this Court’s view evidence he presented below to challenge the same ruling he
challenges on appeal.
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conviction action, both Petitioner and the State of Idaho have struggled in proving or disproving
the existence of Petitioner’s Bluebird Account and its connection, if any, to the checking account
associated with Check #1136, or account ending 0075.”).)
After explaining that the Harland Clarke affidavit only showed that “checks with the
associated 0075 Account number may have been issued to Petitioner[,]” the court concluded:
The Court cannot find that any account linked to that account number actually
existed with funds that may or may not have been available to Petitioner at the time
he wrote the checks forming the basis of the underlying charge. Given that
Petitioner has been unable to produce such evidence of the existence of such an
account after almost two years[,] it cannot be unreasonable for Petitioner’s defense
counsel to have forgone such a fruitless investigation in the underlying case in favor
of procuring a more favorable deal for Petitioner.
met.

Thus, the Court finds that the first prong of the Strickland test has not been

(R., pp.101-102.)
The record in this case shows that, after Detective Buie failed in his attempts to prove the
existence of account number 0075, post-conviction counsel spent many months trying to find such
evidence. Counsel was unable to find any evidence from Wells Fargo or American express that
such an account existed (and in fact was presented additional evidence from America Express that
the account did not exist). Kesling’s post-conviction counsel was only able to uncover evidence
from the company that printed the checks and that the company believed the account was valid,
but no evidence why it so believed. Considering the unsuccessful attempts to validate the existence
of account 0075 made by Detective Buie and Kesling’s post-conviction counsel, and Kesling’s
decision to plead guilty and give up all his defenses while aware of issue, Kesling has failed to
show that his trial counsel’s performance was deficient for forgoing “such a fruitless
investigation.” Kesling has failed to demonstrate that his trial counsel’s performance was deficient
for not further pursuing such a dead-end investigation.
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b.

It Was Not Objectively Unreasonable For Trial Counsel To Believe The
State Would Likely Amend The Charge To I.C. § 18-3601 If It Determined
Account 0075 Existed

The district court also agreed with the state’s argument that, “although [Kesling] was
charged under § 18-3606 [non-existent account], trial counsel knew that if the existence of the
0075 Account had become a disputed issue before trial, the State could have simply amended the
Information to bring the charge under the general forgery statute, § 18-3601, which provides:
Every person who, with intent to defraud another, falsely makes or
alters any check [or] draft with intent to prejudice, damage, or
defraud any person . . . is guilty of forgery.
(R., p.97.) The State asserted that Kesling “admitted on the record to fabricating authorization
numbers on a check, which constitutes knowingly making or altering a check with intent to
defraud, and under the general forgery statute, [he] is guilty of forgery.” (Id.) Indeed, when asked
during his plea colloquy why he wanted to plead guilty, Kesling said, “Because I committed the
act as alleged. I wrote a check to – I believe it was Ada County – and falsified the authorization
number that was required to have the check paid. So I am guilty.” (Supp. R., p.36 (Tr., p.8, Ls.1116).) It should also be noted that, by entering his guilty plea, Kesling waived all his defenses –
legal and factual.
On appeal, Kesling contends the state speculates that (1) it would have “caught the error
and realized it could have charged this case under a different statute,” (2) the court would have
allowed such an amendment, (3) defense counsel would have adequately investigated the new
charge, and (4) Kesling would have pled guilty to the amended charge. (Appellant’s brief, p.13.)
However, the question is not whether it is speculative to conclude that the state would have charged
Kesling with violating I.C. § 18-3601 if counsel had conducted an investigation showing account
0075 existed, or whether Kesling would have pled guilty to such amended charge. Rather, the
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question is whether Kesling has presented evidence showing trial counsel’s decision to not conduct
that investigation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.
According to Kesling’s Amended Petition, “[he] was repeatedly advised that it didn’t
matter whether he did or did not have a Bluebird banking account or accounts.” (Supp. R., p.20.)
That supports the likelihood that Kesling’s trial counsel fully realized Kesling was claiming that
account 0075 existed, and knew that, even if it did exist, he still committed a forgery. Additionally,
Kesling based his guilty plea on the fact that he wrote a fake authorization code on his Bluebird
check, but he did not admit the account was non-existent. (Supp. R., p.36 (Tr., p.8, Ls.11-16).)
Given those facts, it was not objectively unreasonable for Kesling’s trial counsel to conclude that
if he investigated and found evidence showing the 0075 account in fact existed, which evidence
he would undoubtedly have to disclose prior to trial, the state would have amended the charge to
I.C. § 18-3601 to match the evidence. Under I.C.R. 7(e), the state could easily be permitted to
amend the information “at any time before the prosecution rests” because “no additional or
different offense [would be] charged and . . . substantial rights of the defendant [would not be]
prejudiced; the crime would be the same (forgery), Kesling knew (by his guilty plea) that his
conduct constituted forgery, and he was on notice by his trial counsel that he could be convicted
of forgery even if account 0075 existed.
Kesling’s admission during the plea entry hearing falls within the plain language of that
statute. By writing a fake authorization code on the Bluebird check and presenting it as payment
for $130.55 to Ada County, Kesling had the “intent to defraud” Ada County and falsely made or
altered the check with intent to defraud Ada County, making him guilty of forgery. See
- I.C. § 183601. Kesling argues that his conduct does not fit I.C. § 18-3601 because the fake authorization
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code did not negate the negotiability of the check under the U.C.C. (See Appellant’s brief, pp.2325.) Kesling relies upon I.C. § 28-3-106(1), which states:
Unconditional promise or order. (1) Except as provided in this section, for the
purposes of section 28-3-104(1), a promise or order is unconditional unless it states
(i) an express condition to payment, (ii) that the promise or order is subject to or
governed by another writing, or (iii) that rights or obligations with respect to the
promise or order are stated in another writing. A reference to another writing does
not of itself make the promise or order conditional.
(Emphasis added.) According to Detective Buie:
All the checks had a hand-written pre-authorization code and a pre-printed note to
the Bluebird member stating, “Do not forget to get a Pre-authorization Code before
writing this.” A note to the Payee stated, “Confirm the pre-authorization Code at
1-866-289-9588”. The account holder for all the checks was Shawn M. Kesling.
(R., p.31.) Telling the Bluebird member on the face of the check to “not forget to get a Preauthorization Code before writing this,” and the Payee (on the face of the check) to “Confirm the
pre-authorization Code” by calling the listed phone number reasonably qualifies as “an express
condition to payment” under I.C. § 28-3-106(1). Therefore, Kesling’s contention that the fake
authorization code did not affect the check’s negotiability is incorrect. In fact, the check was
deemed non-negotiable by American Express Bluebird because it had a fake authorization code
written on it – Ada County was still owed $130.55. (R., p.32.) More importantly, Kesling’s trial
counsel’s determination that Kesling’s admission fell squarely within I.C. § 18-3601 could not be
deemed objectively unreasonable just because he did not share Kesling’s U.C.C. theory.
Moreover, Kesling states that “he included the terms of his agreement with American
Express/Bluebird as part of his motion for relief from the judgment, and that agreement does, in
fact, include a term which says a check without a pre-authorization code would not be honored by
American Express. (Appellant’s brief, p.24, n.10 (emphasis added); see Supp. R., p.256 (“Each
Bluebird Check must be pre-authorized prior to use, and in order to obtain pre-authorization, you
must have Available Funds in your Bluebird Account in an amount at least equal to the Bluebird
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Check you wish to write. . . . Bluebird Checks that have not been pre-authorized will not be
honored by us, regardless of whether there are sufficient Available Funds in your Bluebird Account
to cover the amount of the Bluebird Check.”), p.257 ("When we pre-authorize your Bluebird
Check, we will provide you with an 8-digit Pre-Authorization Code. The Pre-Authorization Code
must be written by you on the face of your Bluebird Check in the space indicated.”)
Kesling contends the Bluebird authorization rules – particularly the rule stating that,
without valid pre-authorization, a check will not be honored – should not be considered by this
Court because he appealed only from the district court’s initial Memorandum Decision and Order,
and the Bluebird information he submitted was not considered by the court until he filed his Motion
to Alter or Amend. In essence, Kesling asks this Court to ignore relevant information he placed
into the district court record, which the court considered, in support of his motion to amend or alter
the decision that is the subject of this appeal. The state has not found any case law regarding this
scenario; it seems likely no court has entertained such a novel argument. This Court should decline
Kesling’s invitation to ignore the Bluebird rules.
Lastly, it would not have been purely speculative for Kesling’s trial counsel to have
concluded that, had the state amended the charge to I.C. § 18-3601, Kesling would have pled guilty
to it. As it was, Kesling pled guilty to violating I.C. § 18-3606 when he clearly did not agree that
he violated the terms of it by the non-existence of account 0075. There is no reason to believe he
would not have pled guilty to violating a statute (I.C. § 18-3601) that more closely described the
acts he admitted committing when he pled guilty pursuant to I.C. § 18-3606.
In light of Kesling’s admission that he was guilty of forgery for writing a fake authorization
code on his Bluebird check, his trial counsel’s tactical decision not to further investigate the
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existence of account 0075 because he knew the state could amend the charge to I.C. § 18-3601
was not objectively unreasonable.
c.

The District Court Correctly Concluded That It Was Not Objectively
Unreasonable Or Prejudicial For Trial Counsel To Believe That Kesling’s
Guilty Plea Could Be Based On I.C. § 18-3601 And Bishop

According to the district court, the state argued, “even without an amendment, proceeding
as charged under § 18-3606, [Kesling] could have been convicted for violating the provisions of
§ 18-3601, and that conviction would be affirmed on appeal pursuant to State v. Bishop, 89 Idaho
416, 405 P.2d 970 (1965).” (R., p.97.)
In Bishop, the defendant was convicted for violating I.C. §18-3606 even though the
evidence only supported a conviction under §18-3601. 8 Somewhat similar to the charge here,
Bishop passed a check of an allegedly non-existent corporation and the evidence failed to show
the non-existence of that corporation. Bishop explained that the 1931 amendment to the forgery
statutes broadened the definition and punishments to include §18-3606. Bishop, 89 Idaho at 426,
405 P.2d at 976. “Thus in effect the legislature combined sections §18-3601 and §18-3606 as an
all-inclusive definition of the crime of forgery.” Id.
Bishop explained that in State v. Baldwin, 69 Idaho 459, 208 P.2d 161 (1949), the Idaho
Supreme Court “recognized that the two sections taken together contain the definition of forgery
and said: ‘Sections §18-3601 and §18-3606, I.C., defining forgery, set forth a great many acts and
means by which the crime may be committed. The commission of any one of the proscribed acts,
with the intent to defraud is sufficient.’” Id. (quoting Baldwin, 69 Idaho at 464, 208 P.2d at 164).

8

The majority opinion on the issue of whether a conviction insufficient under I.C. § 18-3606 can
be sustained under I.C. § 18-3601 is found in Justice Taylor’s “concurring and dissenting” opinion,
which follows Justice McFadden’s opinion which dissents on the issue. See generally State v.
Bishop, 89 Idaho 416, 405 P.2d 970 (1965).
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Bishop also noted that in State v. Allen, 53 Idaho 737, 27 P.2d 482 (1933), the defendant had been
charged under §18-3601 and argued that he should have been charged under §18-3606. Bishop,
89 Idaho at 426-427, 405 P.2d at 976. The Allen court “brushed the contention aside, saying ‘since
the amendment of [I.C. §18-3606], any and all of the acts mentioned in [that section] as well as
any and all the acts mentioned in [I.C. §18-3601] constitute forgery.’” Id., 89 Idaho at 427, 405
P.2d at 976.
Bishop further explained, “[i]n this case the allegations of the information are sufficient to
charge forgery under both § 18-3601 and § 18-3603.” Id., 89 Idaho at 427, 405 P.2d at 976. The
Court concluded, “[t]he fact that there are allegations in the information alleging additional
elements of forgery as defined in §18-3606 as to which the proof may be insufficient, does not
warrant this court in reversing the conviction, when, as here, the conviction is sustained by proof
of conduct defined as forgery in §18-3601.” Id., 89 Idaho at 428, 405 P.2d at 977 (emphasis
added).
The state argued below that, because the “proof” – namely, Kesling’s admissions when he
pled guilty – sustains conviction under I.C. § 18-3601, his conviction for forgery should be upheld
under Bishop even if it cannot be sustained under I.C. § 18-3606 for passing a fictitious (i.e. nonexistent bank account) check. (Supp. R., pp.160-162.) The district court agreed with the state that
Bishop was directly on point. (R., pp.97-100 (Appendix A, pp.6-9).) Both the state and the district
court appear to have focused on statements in Bishop such as, “the legislature combined sections
§18-3601 and §18-3606 as an all-inclusive definition of the crime of forgery” and “[p]roof of the
commission of the crime by any one of the means or acts set out in the statute will sustain a
conviction.” Bishop, 89 Idaho at 426, 428, 405 P.2d at 976, 977.
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On appeal, Kesling stresses that his case “did not have the additional language that the
information in Bishop did, to assert that he knew, generally, the check was fictitious.” 9
(Appellant’s brief, p.19 (emphasis added).) Kesling appears to contend that the Information
contained language only describing the passing of a fictitious check (I.C. § 18-3606) without also
alleging forgery in the more general terms of I.C. § 18-3601. See Bishop, 89 Idaho at 427, 405
P.2d at 976 (allegations in the Information held sufficient to charge forgery as defined by I.C.
§ 18-3601 and also as defined by § 18-3606).
Even assuming Kesling’s take on Bishop is correct, which the state does not concede, it
does not render his trial counsel’s decision to allow him to plead guilty without conducting further
investigation objectively unreasonable. First, Kesling’s trial counsel would have had to come to
the same detailed understanding of Bishop, as well as its application to his case, that Kesling
proposes. Because some of the legal statements set forth in Bishop suggest that proof of conduct
that satisfies either I.C. § 18-3601 or I.C. § 18-3606 is sufficient alone to prove both offenses when
only one is charged, Kesling’s trial counsel cannot be faulted for not concluding that Bishop
requires the charging document to factually describe both types of conduct.
In sum, in addition to the reasons previously discussed (e.g., lack of proof that account
0075 existed, Kesling’s waiver of all defenses, and that the state could amend the charge),
Kesling’s trial counsel could not have been objectively unreasonable in concluding, as the district
court did, that Bishop would have allowed Kesling’s conviction under I.C. § 18-3606 to be

9

It appears the word “fictitious” may have been used in error (vis-à-vis “fraudulent” or “false”) - unless the state miscomprehends Kesling’s argument. See I.C. § 18-3601. The Information used
the word “fictitious” three times, and its equivalent of “no such bank account in existence” once,
indicating that Kesling knew the check was fictitious. (See Supp. R., p.23.)
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affirmed under I.C. § 18-3601 – making any further investigation pointless, and allowing Kesling
to plead guilty to forgery, albeit under a different theory, a reasonable tactic.
Next, Kesling argues that the district court’s application of Bishop “was improper because
it created [a] constructive amendment, and thus, a fatal variance.” (Appellant’s brief, p.18.)
Assuming the district court incorrectly applied Bishop to rule that Kesling’s charge under I.C.
§ 18-3606 implicitly included his being charged under I.C. § 18-3601, Kesling does not clearly
explain how a fatal variance was created, or how it would function. 10 As discussed, Kesling pled
guilty to forgery, waiving all his defenses, factual and legal.
Assuming that Kesling contends the variance he claims the district court created would
have played out at a jury trial where the charging document would have been inconsistent with the
jury instructions and/or proof, his contention relies on pure speculation that (1) the state would not
have realized prior to trial that it lacked proof that account 0075 did not exist, and (2) the state
would not have amended the Information to I.C. § 18-3601. The state has addressed those
possibilities above, including that the amendment would have preceded trial when the defense
disclosed evidence of the existence of the account in discovery, and those arguments are relied
upon here.
Kesling’s argument that the district court created a variance by applying Bishop is not welltaken. Moreover, it runs far afield from the pertinent question of whether Kesling’s trial counsel
was ineffective for having him plead guilty without further investigation into account 0075’s

10

Kesling states on appeal that, “there was no variance at issue in Bishop itself because, as the
majority concluded, the charging document in that case specifically invoked I.C. § 18-3601 as an
included offense to the allegations made under I.C. § 18-3606.” (Appellant’s brief, p.18.)
Assuming Bishop applies, there can be no variance issue here either.
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existence. Trial counsel’s performance cannot be deemed deficient or prejudicial based on how
the district court subsequently ruled in regard to Bishop.
Further, the Bishop decision explained, “[t]he purpose of the rule prohibiting material
variance between the averments in an information or an indictment and the proof in support thereof
is to avoid surprise to the defendant and to protect the accused from another prosecution for the
same offense.” Bishop, 89 Idaho at 423, 405 P.2d at 973 (emphasis added). Kesling cannot
credibly claim that he was not on notice that he could be convicted of forgery for writing a fake
authorization code on his check to Ada County when that is precisely what he admitted doing that
made him guilty of forgery. (See Supp. R., p.127 (Tr., p.8, Ls.11-16) (“I wrote a check to – I
believe it was to Ada County – and falsified the authorization number that was required to have
the check paid. So I am guilty.”).)
Finally, Kesling states that the “only other basis besides Bishop which the district court
mentioned for its determination on the prejudice prong was that the plea agreement resulted in five
of the six charges against Mr. Kesling being dismissed.” (Appellant’s brief, p.25 (emphasis
added).) Kesling correctly points out that the Idaho Supreme Court has said, “the fact that [the
petitioner] may have benefited by pleading guilty instead of going to trial is not relevant to whether
he was prejudiced by [trial counsel’s] deficient performance.” Booth v. State, 151 Idaho 612, 622
n.9, 262 P.3d 255, 265 n.9 (2011) (emphasis added). Here, the court said that it “notes” the plea
agreement, and did not connect it to a finding of lack of prejudice. Instead, the court mentioned
the plea agreement in regard to the claim that Kesling’s trial counsel was deficient, stating,
Given that Petitioner has been unable to produce such evidence of the existence of
such an account after almost two years[,] it cannot be unreasonable for Petitioner’s
defense counsel to have forgone such a fruitless investigation in the underlying case
in favor of procuring a more favorable deal for Petitioner. The Court notes that
Petitioner was initially charged with seven (7) felony charges prior to his entry of
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a guilty plea under the agreement and that six (6) of those charges were dismissed
based upon that plea deal.
(R., p.101-102 (Appendix A, pp.10-11).)
2.

Prejudice

In regard to prejudice under the second prong of Strickland, the district court succinctly
and correctly held:
Further, while the Court need not reach the second prong of the Strickland test, the
Court notes that under the holding and analysis in State v. Bishop, 89 Idaho 416,
405 P.2d 970 (1965), and given Petitioner’s admission that he forged the
authorization number on the checks in question, the Court would not have been able
to find that “but for counsel’s errors, the outcome would have been different.”
(R., p.102 (Appendix A, p.11).)
The state has argued that Kesling failed to present a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether his trial counsel provided deficient performance under Strickland. Because the deficient
performance and prejudice issues in this case are so intertwined, and because the state’s arguments
showing Kesling’s trial counsel’s performance was not deficient also show his counsel’s
performance was not prejudicial under Strickland, the above arguments apply to both prongs of
Strickland, and need not be repeated here. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-688, 694 (1984).
For the above reasons, and the reasons stated by the district court (Appendix A), Kesling has
failed to show that the district court erred in summarily dismissing his post-conviction petition.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court’s order summarily
dismissing Kesling’s petition for post-conviction relief.
DATED this 13th day of April, 2021.

/s/ John C. McKinney
JOHN C. McKINNEY
Deputy Attorney General
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APPENDIX A

Filed: 01/16/2020 07:39:22
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Phil McGrane, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - Masters, Beth

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF

2

THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

3
4

SHAWN M. KESLING,
5

Petitioner,

CASE NO. CV0l-18-04131

6

7

vs.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER RE: CROSS MOTIONS FOR
SUMMARY DISPOSITION

8
9

THE STATE OF IDAHO,

10

Respondent.

11

12
13
14

INTRODUCTION

Shawn Kesling's ("Petitioner") underlying sentence was imposed in CR0l-17-16283.
Only July 12, 2017, Petitioner pled guilty to MAKING, PASSING, UTTERING, OR
PUBLISHING FICTITIOUS BILLS, NOTES, AND CHECKS, FELONY, LC. §18-3606.

15

Count I of the charging Information provides:

16

COUNT!

17

That the defendant, SHAWN MICHAEL KESLING, on or about the 1st day of
June 2015, in the County of Ada, State of Idaho, did, with the intent to defraud
another, make, and/or pass, and/or utter any fictitious bill, note, or check,
purporting the bill, note, or check in writing for the payment of money or
property of some such bank account when in fact, there is no such bank account
in existence, knowing the same to be fictitious, to-wit: check #1136 from a
fictitious Bluebird bank account made payable to Ada County in the amount of
$130.55.

18
19

20
21

Petitioner was sentenced on October 25, 2017 to a minimum fixed period of confinement of four
22

(4) years, followed by an indeterminate period of custody ofup to ten (10) years, for a total term
23

not to exceed fourteen ( 14) years.

24

On February 28, 2018, Petitioner filed a prose Petitioner for Post-Conviction Relief. On

25

April 11, 2018, the State filed a Motion for Summary Disposition. On May 24, 2018, the Court

26

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER RE: CROSS MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION - Page 1

Page 92

entered an Order for Appointment of Counsel. On June 13, 2018, the Court entered an Order for
Permission to Conduct Civil Discovery, and on September 18, 2018, the Court entered an Order
2
3
4

5

Enlarging Time to File Amended Petition. On November 14, 2018, Petitioner filed an Amended
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief.
On May 21, 2019, Petitioner filed a Motion for Summary Disposition. After numerous
discovery issues, on July 11, 2019, the Court held a hearing on the cross motions for summary
disposition. Subsequent to that hearing, on August 2, 2019, Petitioner filed a Motion to Stay and

6

for Leave to Grant Time to File a Reply Brief. On August 5, 2019, the Court granted the motion.
7

On September 3, 2019, the Petitioner filed a new Motion to Stay Proceedings to permit further

8

investigation into the business records of American Express Bluebird and the check printing

9

company Harland Clarke. On September 9, 2019, the Court entered an Order Denying the

10

Motion to Stay, and on September 10, 2019, Petitioner filed a Motion to Reconsider and Stay
Proceedings. Petitioner submitted an Affidavit of Counsel concerning the difficulty in obtaining

11

information and banking records from Bluebird American Express, Wells Fargo Bank, and to a

12

lesser extent Harland Clarke. On September 12, 2019, the Court entered an Order Granting

13

Motion to Reconsider and Staying Proceedings to allow for further discovery by Petitioner.

14

Having received what it believes is all additional discovery, and having received no further

15

motions or briefing on this matter, the Court now enters its decision and order as follows.
STANDARD

16

An application for post-conviction relief initiates a proceeding that is civil in nature.

17

State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho 676, 678, 662 P.2d 548, 550 (1983). The petitioner "must prove

18

by a preponderance of evidence the allegations upon which the request for post-conviction relief

19

is based." Hughes v. State, 148 Idaho 448, 450, 224 P.3d 515, 517 (Ct. App. 2009). "An
application must contain much more than a short and plain statement of the claim that would

20

suffice for a complaint under I.R.C.P. 8(a)(l)" in that it must be "verified with respect to facts
21

within the personal knowledge of the applicant, and affidavits, records or other evidence

22

supporting its allegations must be attached, or the application must state why such supporting

23

evidence is not included with the application." Id.; Idaho Code § 19-4903. "In other words, the

24

application must present or be accompanied by admissible evidence supporting its allegations,
or the application will be subject to dismissal." Id.

25

26
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Idaho Code § 19--4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for postconviction relief upon the Court's own initiative or pursuant to a motion of a party, if the Court
2

is satisfied that there exists no material issue of fact and the applicant is not entitled to post-

3

conviction relief. Hughes, 148 Idaho at 450-51, 224 P.3d at 517-18. "Summary dismissal of an

4

application for post-conviction relief may be appropriate, however, even where the State does

5

not controvert the applicant's evidence because the court is not required to accept either the
applicant's mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or the applicant's

6

conclusions of law." Id. Moreover, the Court, as the trier-of-fact, is not constrained to draw
7

inferences in favor of the party opposing the motion for summary disposition; rather, the Court

8

is free to arrive at the most probable inferences to be drawn from the uncontroverted evidence.

9

Hayes v. State, 146 Idaho 353, 355, 195 P.3d 712, 714 (Ct. App. 2008). If the uncontroverted

10

evidence is sufficient to justify such inferences, the district court's decision will not be disturbed
on appeal. Id.

11

"Claims may be summarily dismissed if the petitioner's allegations are clearly disproven

12

by the record of the criminal proceedings, if the petitioner has not presented evidence making a

13

prima facie case as to each essential element of the claims, or if the petitioner's allegations do

14

not justify relief as a matter oflaw." McGiboney v. State, 160 Idaho 232, 235, 370 P.3d 747, 750

15

(Ct. App. 2016), review denied (May 12, 2016); Kelly v. State, 149 Idaho 517, 521, 236 P.3d
1277, 1281 (2010); DeRushe v. State, 146 Idaho 599, 603, 200 P.3d 1148, 1152 (2009).

16

However, a claim for post-conviction relief may not be summarily dismissed if the

17

petition, affidavits, and other evidence allege facts that, if true, would entitle the petitioner to

18

relief. Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 792, 102 P.3d 1108, 1111 (2004). If a genuine issue

19

of material fact is presented, an evidentiary hearing must be conducted to resolve the factual
issues. Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 269, 272, 61 P.3d 626, 629 (Ct. App. 2002).

20

ARGUMENTS
21

Petitioner presents two counts in his amended petition for post-conviction relief:

22

COUNTl

23

25

The Petitioner in this case was represented at trial in this matter by the
Ada County Public Defender's Office. That trial counsel did not provide effective
assistance of counsel as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment of the United States
Constitution and made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution, or under the similar protections
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2
3

provided by Article 1, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution, in the following
particulars: failure to properly investigate and obtain evidence in defense of the
crime; to wit; bank account statements and records that proved or tended to prove
that he did not write checks on an account that did not exit. Counsel did not
challenge the State's theory at a preliminary hearing or at any other stage of the
proceedings, but instead pressured Petitioner into a plea agreement.

4

COUNT2

5

That the State of Idaho violated Petitioner's right to due process of law by
charging and prosecuting a crime of Forgery against Petitioner without
conducting any reasonable investigation and inquiry into the actual facts of the
case, instead proceeding to prosecute without establishing whether any Bluebird
banking accounts existed. As a result Petitioner was arrested, forced to plead
guilty and incarcerated for a crime for which he is innocent.

6

7
8

ANALYSIS
9

The issue of ineffective assistance of counsel is properly raised in a post-conviction

10

setting. See Matthews v. State, 122 Idaho 801, 806, 839 P.2d 1215, 1220 (1992). To prevail on a

11

claim of ineffective assistance, a petitioner must overcome the strong presumption that

12

counsel's performance was adequate by demonstrating "that counsel's representation did not

13

meet objective standards of competence." Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644, 648-49, 873 P.2d 898,
902-03 (Ct. App. 1994).

14

Claims alleging ineffective assistance of counsel are evaluated under the two-part test set

15

forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984). Under this test, the

16

petitioner must demonstrate that counsel's performance was deficient and that the petitioner was

17

prejudiced by the deficiency. Id. at 687-88, 104 S.Ct. at 2064-65. To establish deficient
performance, the applicant must prove that counsel's representation fell below an objective

18

standard of reasonableness. Id. Where the petitioner was convicted by entry of a guilty plea, the
19

petitioner must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he or

20

she would not have pied guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. Plant v. State, 143

21

Idaho 758, 762, 152 P.3d 629, 633 (Ct. App. 2006).

22

In order to avoid summary dismissal, the petitioner must allege sufficient facts under
both parts of the test. Martinez v. State, 125 Idaho 844, 875 P.2d 941 (Ct. App. 1994). "When

23

evaluating an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, this Court does not second-guess strategic
24

and tactical decisions, and such decisions cannot serve as a basis for post-conviction relief

25

unless the decision is shown to have resulted from inadequate preparation, ignorance of the

26
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relevant law or other shortcomings capable of objective review." State v. Yakovac, 145 Idaho
437, 444, 180 P.3d 476, 483 (2008). "There is a strong presumption that trial counsel was
2
3
4

5

competent and that trial tactics were based on sound legal strategy." Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho
50, 58-59, 106 P.3d 376, 384-85 (2004).
Petitioner argues that there now exists evidence of material facts, not previously
presented by counsel and heard, that requires vacation of conviction and sentence. Petitioner
contends that documents obtained from Bluebird a subsidiary of American Express, clearly

6

establish that Shawn Kesling had two active accounts with American Express Bluebird in June,
7

2015 and an account statement for Petitioner's Bluebird Account shows deposit activity of

8

$3709.64 from 5/21/15 to 6/20/15 for his Bluebird account, which included a direct deposit

9

feature from his employer, cash reloads, and fees associated with check activity. Petitioner

10

contends that he ordered checks four times over the years on his Bluebird American Express
Account with check series runs from # 1001-1400, the same check range for all checks identified

11

by the State of Idaho in discovery or included in the information.

12

Petitioner argues that his trial counsel affirmatively advised Petitioner to waive his

13

preliminary hearing and Petitioner was told it did not matter whether the account did or did not

14

exist by his attorney because Petitioner was accused of printing in a "preauthorization code" on

15

a Bluebird check. Petitioner argues that this advice is legally incorrect and completely irrelevant
to the charge in the information because Petitioner was charged with forgery of an instrument on

16

an account that did not exist. Petitioner concludes that his counsel advised him to enter a plea of

17

guilty without obtaining bank records available to prove that Petitioner did have valid Bluebird

18

accounts with checking privileges and printed checks.

19

In response, the State points out, and the Court agrees, that the Amended Petition
includes five attachments; the last three appear to be American Express records from May and

20

June of 2015. However, none of those accounts are the 007 5 Account from which Petitioner is
21

alleged to have made the check that was the subject of his forgery conviction. Further, the State

22

contends that nearly five months later, ten months after the Court allowed discovery, on April

23

30, 2019, Petitioner disclosed a nine-page series of documents obtained from Harland Clarke

24

Holdings Corp., a check printing company, purporting to show Harland Clarke's receipt or
processing of certain check orders pertaining to the 007 5 Account at issue. The State argues that

25
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Petitioner has failed to provide the Court with sufficient evidence to show that existence of the
alleged checking account; however, the State argues that the existence or nonexistence of the
2

account is a red herring. The State contends that even assuming that the account did exist,

3

Petitioner still committed a forgery because he admitted on the record to fabricating fictional

4

authorization codes on the check at issue. The State argues that Petitioner's conviction for

5

forgery is valid under § 18-3606 because he made and passed a check that was tied to no
authorizing bank, and/or it is valid under §18-3601 because he made a false check with intent to

6

defraud. The State concludes that because Petitioner's trial counsel knew the existence of the
7

account was legally immaterial, his strategic decisions were objectively reasonable and the State

8

did not Violate Petitioner's right to due process because Petitioner was not arbitrarily deprived

9

of his rights and he had notice and opportunity to be heard.

10

The State argues that alternatively, although Petitioner was charged under § 18-3606,
trial counsel knew that if the existence of the 007 5 Account had become a disputed issue before

11

12

trial, the State could have simply amended the Information to bring the charge under the general
forgery statute, §18-3601, which provides:

14

Every person who, with intent to defraud another, falsely makes or alters any
check [or] draft with intent to prejudice, damage, or defraud any person ... is
guilty of forgery.

15

LC. §18-3601. The State contends that Petitioner admitted on the record to fabricating

13

16

authorization numbers on a check, which constitutes knowingly making or altering a check with
intent to defraud, and under the general forgery statute, Petitioner is guilty of forgery. The State

17

argues that even without an amendment, proceeding as charged under § 18-3606, Petitioner

18

could have been convicted for violating the provisions of §18-3601, and that conviction would

19

be affirmed on appeal pursuit to State v. Bishop, 89 Idaho 416, 405 P .2d 970 (1965). Bishop

20

provides in relevant part:

21

22
23
24

Prior to 1931 what is now LC. § 18-3606 defined and fixed the punishment for
an offense separate and apart from the crime of forgery. The 1931 session of the
legislature (S.L. 31, ch. 171, p. 284) amended that section by providing that a
person violating its provisions 'is guilty of forgery and punishable as provided by
section 8411 [now LC. § 18-3604].' By that action the legislature broadened the
definition of forgery as theretofore defined by LC.§ 18-3601, to include the acts
proscribed by LC. § 18-3606. Thus in effect the legislature combined sections
18-3601 and 18-3606 as an all-inclusive definition of the crime of forgery.

25

26

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER RE: CROSS MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION - Page 6

Page 97

In State v. Baldwin, 69 Idaho 459, 208 P.2d 161, this court recognized that the
two sections taken together contain the definition of forgery, and said:
2
3
4

5
6

7
8
9

10
11

12
13
14

15
16

17
18
19

20
21

22
23

'* * * Sections 18-3601 and 18-3606, LC., defining forgery, set forth a great
many acts and means by which the crime may be committed. The commission of
any one of the proscribed acts, with the intent to defraud, is sufficient. State v.
McDermott, 52 Idaho 602, 17 P.2d 343; State v. Allen, 53 Idaho 737, 27 P.2d
482. It is obvious that the commission of the crime of forgery cannot be limited
to cases requiring 'that the defendant forged or counterfeited the seal and
handwriting of another.' Further, the crime is committed by making, altering,
etc., with the necessary intent as well as by uttering, publishing, passing, etc.,
with intent. If the prosecution proves the commission of the offense by either of
these means, it is sufficient. The state is not required to prove both, as was
requested by the appellant. State v. McDermott, supra.' 69 Idaho at 464, 208 P .2d
at 164.
In State v. Allen, 53 Idaho 737, 27 P.2d 482, the state charged forgery by the
making and passing of a false bank check under the provisions of LC. § 18-3601.
As here, the check was set out in the information. The defendant was convicted
and on appeal contended that the charge was not properly brought under the
provisions of§ 18-3601, and that since it consisted of the making and passing of
a fictitious check the charge should have been brought under § 18-3606. The
court brushed the contention aside, saying:
'So that since the amendment of section 8414, C.S., now section 17-3706, LC.A.
[now LC. § 18-3606], any and all of the acts mentioned in section 17-3706, as
well as any and all the acts mentioned in section 17-3701, LC.A. [now LC. § 183601], constitute forgery.'
In other words, this court has said that an accused may be convicted of
forgery by means of a fictitious check under the provisions of either § 183601 or § 18-3606, according to the allegations and proof in that particular
case.

In this case the allegations of the information are sufficient to charge forgery
under both § 18-3601 and § 18-3606. The words 'did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully, intentionally and feloniously and with the intent to defraud
Altertson's Vista Food Center, attempt to utter, publish and pass as true and
genuine * * * a certain false and fictitious check * * * and the said check was
false and fictitious as he, the said defendant, then and there well knew,' are
sufficient to charge forgery as defined by § 18-3601. Coupled with these
allegations the other allegations of the information are sufficient to charge
forgery as defined by§ 18-3606.

****

25

We have repeatedly held that when a statute defining a crime provides that the
crime may be committed by several means or by several acts, any or all of such
means or acts may be charged in the conjunctive, and that such a charge is not
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2
3
4

5
6

7
8
9

10
11

12
13
14

15
16

17
18
19

duplicitous, and charges but one offense, State v. Coburn, 82 Idaho 437, 354 P.2d
751 (1960); State v. Anderson, 82 Idaho 293 352 P.2d 972 (1960); State v. Petty.
73 Idaho 136, 248 P.2d 218 (1952); State v. Scott, 72 Idaho 202, 239 P.2d 258
(1951); State v. Linebarger, 71 Idaho 255, 232 P.2d 669 (1951); State v. Ayres,
70 Idaho 18, 211 P.2d 142 (1949); State v. Salhus, 68 Idaho 75, 189 P.2d 372
(1948); State v. Monteith, 53 Idaho 30, 20 P.2d 1023 (1933); State v. Alvord, 46
Idaho 765, 271 P. 322 (1928); State v. Brown, 36 Idaho 272, 211 P. 60 (1922);
State v. Gruber, 19 Idaho 692, 115 P. 1 (1911). Proof of the commission of the
crime by any one of the means or acts set out in the statute will sustain a
conviction.
In State v. Brown, supra, this court quoted the Supreme Court of Kansas as
follows:
'Where the statute makes either of two or more distinct acts connected with the
same general offense, and subject to the same measure and kind of punishment,
indictable separately and as distinct crimes, when each shall have been
committed by different persons, and at different times, they may, when
committed by the same person and at the same time, be coupled in one count as
constituting all together but one offense. In such cases * * * the offender may be
informed against as for one combined act in violation of the [statute], and proof
of either of the acts mentioned in the statute and set forth in the information will
sustain a conviction.' State v. Schweiter, 27 Kan. 499; State v. Sherman, 81 Kan.
874, 107 Pac. 33, 36 Idaho at 276, 211 P. at 61.
The fact that there are allegations in the information alleging additional
elements of forgery as defined in § 18-3606 as to which the proof may be
insufficient, does not warrant this court in reversing the conviction, when, as
here, the conviction is sustained by proof of conduct defined as forgery, in §
18-3601. State v. Baldwin, supra; State v. Allen, supra; State v. McDermott, 52
Idaho 602, 17 P.2d 343.
State v. Bishop, 89 Idaho 416, 426-28, 405 P.2d 970, 976-77 (1965) (emphasis added).

The State argues that Bishop is directly on point here. Petitioner was charged in the
information under § 18-3606, the more specific of the two statutes, and if the Court should find
that the record does not support a conviction under that statute, under Bishop, the State argues

20

the Court may consider whether the charging language in the Information and record supports a

21

conviction under the broader § 18-3601. The State contends that the record does support a

22

conviction under §18-3601 because Petitioner provided sufficient facts for a conviction on the

23

record at his plea hearing:
Judge: Would you tell me in your own words why you wish to plead guilty?

24

25
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2

Kesling: Because I committed the act as alleged. I wrote a check to- I believe
Count I is Ada County - and falsified the authorization numbers, which
required to have the check paid; so I am guilty.
The State argues that under either section, § 18-3606 or § 18-3601, trial counsel knew that by

3

admitting to police that he had fabricated the codes, Petitioner had admitted to forgery.

4

Consequently his decision to forego further investigation regarding the existence of the alleged

5

account, as well as his advice to waive the preliminary hearing in order to preserve a settlement

6

offer, and ultimately his advice to plead guilty to take advantage of that offer were all

7

objectively reasonable strategic decisions and resulted in no prejudice because there is no
reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different if he had found evidence that

8

the 0075 account existed. The Court agrees with the State.

9

Under Strickland, an applicant for post-conviction relief must demonstrate: (1) counsel's

10

performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) there is a reasonable

11

probability that, but for counsel's errors, the outcome would have been different. Strickland, 466
U.S. at 669, 104 S.Ct. 2052. These prongs are known more precisely as (1) deficient

12

performance and (2) resulting prejudice. Id. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Here, the Court cannot find
13

that Petitioner's defense counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of

14

reasonableness. Petitioner argues that his defense counsel should have investigated the existence

15

of Petitioner's Bluebird American Express checking account, and that defense counsel's failure

16

to pursue such an investigation falls below an objective standard of reasonableness. The Court
disagrees.

17

At this point in the proceedings, Petitioner has been given approximately nineteen (19)

18

months, since the entry of the Court's order for Permission to Conduct Civil Discovery, to

19

produce some evidence from Bluebird American Express or Wells Fargo of the existence of the

20

007 5 Account in question. Petitioner has failed to do so. At best, Petitioner has submitted the

21

affidavit of Lowell James Mix, Jr., the Director Client Management-Private Label for Harland
Clarke Corp. The affidavit provides in relevant part:

22
23
24

25
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4. Based upon my review of the business records , a copy of which are attach ed hereto, the
2

records fo r Harland Clarke show that fo ur check. orders were made through the American

3

Express Bluebird onl ine web rortal on Mr. Kesling's account. Four check orders were

4

transmitted from American Ex.press Bluebird to Harland Clarke who printed and delivered the

5

check orders to Mr. Kesling's address shown on the account.

6

7

5. American Express operated the ordering portal for Bluebird account check orders. After the
orders were placed, American Express validated the orders and then transm itted them

8

electronically to Harland C larke for printing. Harland Clarke had no direct contact with Mr.
9

Kesling and on ly printed validated orders transmitted to it from Ame rican Express.
10

11

6. The

check

o rders

reference

American

Express

Bluebi rd

account

number

12

72321927360075. T he check orders were sh ipped to Mr. Kesling at the address shown

13

on the orders.

14

records of Mr. Kesling other than the check o rder informatio n attached hereto.

15

Harland Clarke does not maintain o r possess an y banking or fin ancial

7. Neither Harla nd C la rke nor I have any personal knowledge as to Mr. Kesllng's account

16

stalus with American Express Bl uebird other than Harland Clarke received validated
17

o rders from Amer ican Express that were then printed and delivered by Harland Clarke.
18

As stated in the affidavit itself, "Harland Clarke does not maintain or possess any banking or
19

financial records of Mr. Kesling other than the check order information attached hereto." Based
20

upon the submitted affidavit from Harland Clarke, the Court could only find that checks with

21

the associated 0075 Account number may have been issued to Petitioner. The Court cannot find

22

that any account linked to that account number actually existed with funds that may or may not

23

have been available to Petitioner at the time he wrote the checks forming the basis of the
underlying charge. Given that Petitioner has been unable to produce such evidence of the

24

existence of such an account after almost two years; it cannot be unreasonable for Petitioner's
25
26
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defense counsel to have forgone such a fruitless investigation in the underlying case in favor of
procuring a more favorable deal for Petitioner. The Court notes that Petitioner was initially
2
3
4

5

charged with seven (7) felony charges prior to his entry of a guilty plea under the agreement and
that six (6) of those charges were dismissed based upon that plea deal.
Thus, the Court finds that the first prong of the Strickland test has not been met. Further,
while the Court need not reach the second prong of the Strickland test, the Court notes that
under the holding and analysis in State v. Bishop, 89 Idaho 416, 405 P .2d 970 (1965), and given

6

Petitioner's admission that he forged the authorization number on the checks in question, the
7

Court would not have been able to find that "but for counsel's errors, the outcome would have

8

been different." As both of Petitioner's arguments in his petitioner are based on lack of adequate

9

investigation into the existence of the 0075 Account, the foregoing analysis is the same with

10

respect to Petitioner's claim against the State for lack of due process during prosecution of the
underlying case.

11

CONCLUSION
12
13

Petitioner's Motion for Summary Disposition is denied. The State's Motion for
Summary Disposition is granted.

14

15

IT IS SO ORDERED.

16

17
18

Signed: 1/15/2020 05:24 PM

DATED this _ _ day of _ _ _ _, 2020.

wa_ -

19

20
21

Michael J. Reardon.............,.
District Judge

22
23
24

25
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
2

The undersigned authority does hereby certify that on the 16th

day of January

3

2020, I served one copy of the:
4
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5

to each of the parties below as follows:
6

7
8
9
10

Joseph Ellsworth, TSB #3702
ELLSWORTH, KALLAS, TALLBOY & DEFRANCO P.L.L.C.
Phone: (208) 336-1843
Facsimile: (208) 345-8945
Email: jle@greyhawklaw.com

11
12

13
14

Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
Telephone: (208) 287-7700
Facsimile: (208) 287-7709
Email: acpocourtdocs@adaweb.net

15
16
17

PHIL MCGRANE
Clerk of the District Court
Ada County, Idaho

18
19

20

Date:

Signed: 1/16/2020 0739 AM

By

],rlJ\A.,.,,.ui.A
Deputy Clerk
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